Penn State International Law Review
Volume 4
Number 2 Dickinson Journal of International Law

Article 4

1986

An Analysis of the 1984 Draft Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Pubishment
Ahcene Boulesbaa

Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Boulesbaa, Ahcene (1986) "An Analysis of the 1984 Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Pubishment," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 4: No. 2, Article 4.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol4/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.

An Analysis of the 1984 Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Pubishment
Cover Page Footnote

The author wishes to thank Professor Richard Pierre Claude of the University of Maryland for his critical
comments, advice, and support during the writing of this article. The author is indebted to Professor Joseph B.
Kelly of the Dickinson School of Law and Professor Noyes E. Leech of the University of Pennsylvania for their
valuable guidance while he attended those institutions. Last, the author expresses his appreciation for to the
government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria for its financial support of his education in the
United States.

This article is available in Penn State International Law Review: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol4/iss2/4

An Analysis of the 1984 Draft
Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment
Ahcene Boulesbaa*
I.

Introduction

The achievement of social progress and a better standard of life
for all citizens of the world depends upon both a recognition of the
inherent dignity and worth of each human being and a resolute observance of human rights.' Likewise, friendly relations and cooperation among nations also depends upon the general acceptance and
recognition of the inherent dignity of the individual and the necessity
of honoring human rights.'
The signatory nations of the United Nations recognized and
committed themselves to the promotion and encouragement of
* Legal Counsel to Director, International Relations Office, University of Maryland,
College Park, MD; J.D. 1976, University of Constantine Law School (Algeria); M.C.L. 1978,
The Dickinson School of Law; LL.M. 1980, University of Pennsylvania; Ph.D. Candidate
1986, University of Maryland. The author's work experience includes a position as Administrative Judge, Superior Court of Constantine (Algeria) 1975-76 and a position as in-house
legal counsel to B.M.S., Inc., Philadelphia, PA 1981-82. The author wishes to thank Professor
Richard Pierre Claude of the University of Maryland for his critical comments, advice, and
support during the writing of this article. The author is also indebted to Professor Joseph B.
Kelly of the Dickinson School of Law and Professor Noyes E. Leech of the University of
Pennsylvania for their valuable guidance while he attended those institutions. Last, the author
expresses his appreciation to the government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria for its financial support of his education in the United States.
I. The Preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in part:
"[Riecognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world." G.A. Res.
217A (Ill), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948). See also The Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons From Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/
1034 (1975).
2. Article 55 of the Charter of the United Nations states:
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect
for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United
Nations shall promote: . . .
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.
U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para. c.
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human rights when they endorsed the Charter of the United Nations.3 Debate yet rages among those nations, however, concerning
the extent of each member's obligation to enforce human rights principles. On one side is the position that the pledges of the member
nations impose upon them the legal obligation to enforce and police
human rights both within their own borders as well as within the
domestic territories of other member nations. 4 Under this theory actions enforcing human rights must be taken by states individually as
well as in conjunction with the United Nations organization. Nations
opposing this theory assert that the Charter provisions dealing with
human rights merely preclude member nations from violating those
rights within their own borders. The Charter, they insist, does not
allow any member nation or the United Nations organization to in5
terfere with the domestic jurisdiction of any other member nation.
Nations supporting the latter non-interference principle point to
Article 2 paragraphs 4 and 76 of the Charter to buttress their argument. Article 2 paragraph 4 states: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state
. . .. -Paragraph 7 of that same Article contains what is often referred to as the "domestic jurisdiction" clause: "Nothing contained
in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
3. The Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations provides:
WE THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DETERMINED . . .
to reaffirm faith in fundamental rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women . .. , and . . .
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
AND FOR THESE ENDS . . .
HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.
U.N. CHARTER preamble.
In addition to the Preamble, under chapter 1 of the Charter, Article I paragraph 3 states:
"The Purpose of the United Nations are: . . . To achieve international cooperation in . . .
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion..
U.N. CHARTER art. I, para. 3.
See also U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
4. See H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 29-30 (1950).
5. R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 38
(1979) [hereinafter cited as LILLICH].
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 4 and 7. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 56 which states:
"All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." (For the pertinent
text of Article 55, see supra note 2.) The delegations involved in drafting the Charter insisted
that Article 56 did not grant the United Nations organization the authority to interfere with
the internal affairs of its members. Article 2, paragraph 7, precluding the United Nations from
interfering in the domestic affairs of any member nation, was held to limit the scope of Article
56. Schachter, The Charter and the Constitution: The Human Rights Provisions in American
Law, 4 VAND. L. REV. 643, 646-53 (1951); LILLICH, supra note 5, at 39. For more information
regarding Article 2, paragraph 7, see infra text accompanying note 8.
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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settlement under the present Charter ....
This principle of non-interference in matters essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of other states is one of two major obstacles
inhibiting the international enforcement and implementation of
human rights. The other major obstacle is known as the declaration
of competence requirement. International legal instruments governing the enforcement of human rights cannot bind a state party
unless that party formally recognizes the competence of the organization in charge of supervising the implementation of the instrument
to deal with questions concerning the internal affairs of that party
state. 9 These two obstacles, the non-interference principle and the
declaration of competence requirement, have heretofore effectively
neutralized any international mechanism established to promote and
enforce human rights."0
The need to have an effective enforcement mechanism is acute.
This is particularly true when the violation of human rights involves
8. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
9. See, e.g., United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/L.2, at art. 21, para. I [hereinafter cited as Draft
Convention Against Torture]. Article 21 states:
A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare under this article
that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is
not fulfilling its obligations under this Convention. Such communications may be
received and considered according to the procedures laid down in this article
only if submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in
regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be
dealt with by the Committee under this article if it concerns a State Party which
has not made such a declaration ....
See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at art. 41, adopted December
16, 1966, entered into force March 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter cited as International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights]; I K. VASAK, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, 3536 (1982).
10. Many scholars have commented on the ineffectiveness of enforcement mechanisms.
Theo Van Boven, former director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights has commented that "[tihe methods for tackling violations of human rights are still in their infancy
and often inadequate to deal with the problems faced." T. VAN BOVEN, PEOPLE MATTER:
VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 35 (1982). See also Watson, A Realistic
Jurisprudenceof International Law, 1980 Y.B. WORLD AFFAIRS 265 (1980); Watson, Legal
Theory, Efficacy and Validity in the Development of Human Rights Norms in International
Law, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 609 [hereinafter cited as Legal Theory]. Professor Watson holds that
the international legal system is not and never will be a supranational type of legal order.
International law will therefore never have the hierarchial coercive type of enforcement power
characteristic of domestic systems of law. Professor Anthony D'Amato, author of D'Amato,
The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1110 (1982) [hereinafter cited as D'Amato], views the problems of enforcement from a totally different perspective. He argues that although the international legal system does not have a hierarchial order,
it does possess a flexible enforcement mechanism allowing for the horizontal imposition of
sanctions. Thus when one nation feels its entitlements have been violated, whether those entitlements involve human rights or some other right, that nation can "declare the nation that
violates an entitlement a temporary outlaw . . . [Tihe nation or nations [may then] . . . retaliate . . . by in turn disregarding one or more of the outlaw nation's entitlements." Id. at 1120.
For more on the Watson/D'Amato debate see infra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
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torture. Present political conditions in various parts of the world
make torture one of today's major human rights issues. 1 Torture is
the ultimate offense against the dignity of man.'" It may never be
justified under any circumstances.'8 Torture violates international legal and political commitments and thwarts those efforts for harmony
and cooperation among nations that are so necessary to the maintenance of peace and world order."
The 1984 Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 15 is an attempt by
the nations of the world to create a system through which torture
can be prevented. In developing this system the drafters had to formulate a method for dealing with the issues of non-interference and
the declaration of competence requirement that previously limited
and indeed crippled other international human rights agreements. In
many ways the enforcement mechanism set forth in the Draft Convention is a positive response to these issues. In others the Convention is still limited by those persistent problems that plagued past
agreements.
This article will review specific provisions of the Draft Convention Against Torture. Those sections that resolve the conflicting interests at the heart of the non-interference and declaration of competence principles will be highlighted. Those provisions in which the
drafters were unable to reach an effective compromise will also be
analyzed. The article will focus in one section upon the current Watson/D'Amato debate'" regarding the existence or non-existence of
world-wide enforcement power. Finally, the article will propose further methods through which nations can enforce and promote human
rights throughout the world.
It. Torture is systematically practiced by at least one-third of the world's governments.
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/SR.33 (1984).
12.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES

6-8 (1984).

13. Torture, even when supervised by physicians, may never be justified. The medical
profession recognizes this fact. Health professionals, particularly physicians, are under the ethical obligation primum non nocere (above all do no harm) not to assist any government, directly or indirectly, that practices torture and/or psychiatric confinement. For a complete discussion of the unethical involvement of doctors in torture and psychiatric abuse see THE
BREAKING OF BODIES AND MINDS 1-21 (E. Stover & E. Nightingale 1985). The December 18,
1982 resolution of the United Nations General Assembly also explicitly prohibits such participation and assistance by members of the health profession. 37 U.N. GAOR Annexes Vol. 11,
12 Doc. A/37/727.
14.

See U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para. c.

15.

Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9.

16.

See supra note 10. See also infra text accompanying notes 81-90.
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II. The Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The Draft Convention Against Torture is a codification of customary international law as that law relates to the prohibition of torture." The first article of the Draft establishes the scope of the Convention by defining the term "torture." Following this clarification
the Draft then sets forth a system for enforcement. This system can
roughly be divided into two categories. The first category calls for
action to be taken by the party states individually. The second defines the power of the organization of party states as a whole and
establishes a method whereby that organization can take action to
enforce the Draft Convention's prohibitions against torture.
To understand this enforcement system, it is necessary to understand the Convention's definition of torture and how the drafters
came to agree upon that definition.
A.

The Definition of Torture under the Draft Convention of 1984

Article I of the Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment defines torture as
[a]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.'"
This is the definition upon which the drafters compromised. It is
not, however, completely satisfactory. Its weakpoint is in the fact
that it covers only intentional governmental actions. It does not cover
gross negligence or negligence of the government. Nor does it apply
to actions taken by individuals who are not government officials. The
Draft Convention would give the party states significantly more authority if, as in the International Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Racial Discrimination, 19 it provided for protection
17.

Lillich, Global Protection of Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS

IN INTERNATIONAL

LAw; LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 127 (T. Meron ed. 1984).

18. Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art. I.
19. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination,
opened for signature March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (adopted Dec. 21, 1965 and entered
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against bodily harm whether inflicted by government officials, intentionally or negligently, or by any individual, group, or institution.
In addition, Article I of the Convention excepts from its definition of torture inflictions of pain or suffering "inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions." It fails, however, to explain what acts constitute "lawful sanctions." A state can therefore argue that certain
acts causing pain or suffering are "inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions" in that system of government and thus do not constitute
torture as defined in Article I of the Convention.2
The Canadian delegation to the working group on the Draft
Convention complained about the ambiguity of the "lawful sanctions" exception in Article 1.21 Anthony William of England also expressed dissatisfaction and claimed that the vagueness of the definition would only make implementation of the Convention less
effective. 2 He proposed that the Draft definition be improved. Other
delegations in the working group also expressed the opinion that
"torture" should have been given a more precise definition particularly since the Convention made torture a criminal offense. The representative from Uruguay even queried whether, under the definition
adopted, any sanction causing pain or suffering could be considered

lawful.23

Notwithstanding these reservations, the Draft Convention's definition was not changed. As the Draft Convention of 1984 now stands
the "lawful sanctions" provision remains unclarified2" and actions ininto force January 4, 1969).
20. The Draft Convention easily could have been more precise in its definition of "lawful sanctions" by borrowing the language adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
its Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), 30 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975)). Article I of that Declaration simply
states that "the exclusion of acts inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions" must be consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. (The Standard Minimum Rules were adopted August 30, 1955). First United Nations Congress on the Prevention
of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Annex I(A), U.N. Doc. A/CON F.6 (1956). Article
31 of the Minimum Rules provides that "Corporal punishment, punishment by placing in a
dark cell, and all cruel, inhuman or degrading punishments shall be completely prohibited as
punishments for disciplinary offences." Id. at art. 31. Article 32(2) of those same Rules states
that no punishment shall be inflicted that "may be prejudicial to the physical or mental health
or a prisoner." Id. at art. 32, para. 2.
21. Report of the Working Group on the Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/72, 7
(1984).
22. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/SR.33, 8 (1984).
23. Id. at 10 (question by Mr. Ballesteros).
24. In the event questions concerning the extent of the exception arise in the future, the
parties involved in the dispute will perhaps rely on the interpretations given to similar provisions in other international human rights documents. For example, in the Greek Case [1969] 1
Y.B. Eur. Cony. on Human Rights I (Eur. Comm. on Human Rights), the European Commission of Human Rights interpreted a provision analogous to the "lawful sanctions" exception
contained in Article I of the Draft Convention as follows:
[A]ll torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and inhuman
treatment also degrading. The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such
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volving torture committed by individuals remain outside the scope of
the Convention.
B. Methods of Enforcement Governments

Actions to be Taken by Individual

The powers and responsibilities imposed on individual governments to ensure the enforcement of the principles established under
the Draft Convention are set forth in Articles 5 and 7. Article 525
outlines a system of universal jurisdiction based on the place of torture, the nationality of the offender, the presence of the offender in
the territory of a state party, and the nationality of the victim.
Under Article 5, state parties are required to take any measures necessary to establish jurisdiction over persons accused of offenses condemned in the Draft's Article 4.26 Under Article 727 state parties are
treatment as deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which in
the particular situation, is unjustifiable.
The word "torture" is often used to describe inhuman treatment, which has
a purpose, such as the obtaining of information or confessions, or the infliction of
punishment, and it is generally an aggravated form of inhuman treatment.
Treatment or punishment of [an] individual may be said to be degrading if it
grossly humiliates him before others or drives him to act against his will or
conscience.
Id. at 186.
25. Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art.. 5. Article 5 as finally
adopted is as follows:
I. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the following
cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers
it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary
to establish its jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender
is present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him
pursuant to article 8 to any of the States mentioned in paragraph I of this
article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with internal law.
Id.
26. Article 4 of the Draft Convention provides as follows:
I. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under
its criminal law. The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an
act by any person which constitutes complicity or participation in torture.
2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate
penalties which take into account their grave nature.
Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art. 4.
27. Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art. 7, paras. 1 and 2. Article 7
reads:
1. The State Party in territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged
to have committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found, shall in the cases
contemplated in article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.
2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the
case of any ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State. In
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also obligated to prosecute any person accused of torture over whom
they have jurisdiction. This prosecution is to take place in the same
manner as the prosecution of an individual accused of violating the
laws of that state. In the event a state either cannot or will not try
such a person in its own courts, the state is then obligated under that
same Article 7 to extradite the individual to another state party for
prosecution.2 8 The purpose of the universal jurisdictional system established by Articles 5 and 7 is to eliminate any potential havens for
alleged torturers.
The first drafts of these articles were submitted by the Swedes
in 1981.29 Substantial debate arose in the 1981 session over specific
language contained in these drafts."0 But in 1982 certain delegates to
the working group responsible for drafting the Convention began to
consider the more serious question of whether a system of universal
jurisdiction should be included at all. They reasoned that the difficulties involved in transferring evidence from the country where the
crime had been committed to the state of arrest and trial would
make such a system inoperable."1 In reply, other delegations asserted
that universal jurisdiction was essential to the success of the Draft
Convention. The Convention was intended to deal with situations in
which torture comprised a portion of state policy. Without the universal jurisdiction provisions of Articles 5 and 7 such torture would
go unpunished because the state in question would not, by definition,
prosecute its own officials for complying with state policy.
The differences in the positions expressed by the various delegations and the need for an effective Convention supported world-wide
led the Brazilian representative to propose a modified system of universal jurisdiction in the 1983 session of the working group. Under
the Brazilian proposal, a state would be required to exercise universal jurisdiction: when the alleged offenses had been committed in any
the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph 2, the standards of evidence required
for prosecution and conviction shall in no way be less stringent than those which
apply in the cases referred to in article 5, paragraph I.
3. Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection with
any of the offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at
all stages of the proceedings.

id.
28. Id. at para. 1.
29. For a copy of the text of the Swedish draft see Report of the Working Group on a
Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982/L.40, 5 (1982).
30. Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L. 1576, 7
(1981), Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982/L.40, 5
(1982).
31. Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982/L.40, 6
(1982).
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territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered within that state; when the alleged offender was a national of
that state; or when the victim was a national of that state if the state
considered it appropriate. However, if the state had no jurisdiction
based on these criteria but had within its territory a person it believed should be prosecuted for crimes of torture, that state was
under an obligation to notify other states which would have jurisdiction and entertain any requests made by those states for extradition.
In the event states having jurisdiction did not request extradition
within 60 days, the state having the offender in its custody was required to establish its own jurisdiction over the case. 32 The proposal
was considered by some of the representatives to be a good basis for
compromise. They recommended that all delegations study it
carefully.
At the 1984 session a breakthrough took place. During the time
between the 1983 and 1984 sessions, all of the dissenting delegations
had changed their positions to endorse the inclusion of a system of
universal jurisdiction in the Draft Convention.33 Thus, Articles 5 and
7 in their current form were adopted by the working group. 4 Under
these Articles, a state finding an alleged torturer within its territory
is obligated to either prosecute that individual or extradite him to
another party state for prosecution 5 when the offenses are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that state, 36 when the alleged offender is a national of that state, 37 or when the victim is a national of that state
and the state considers it appropriate. 8
32. For the text of the Brazilian proposal see Report of the Working Group on a Draft
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1983/L.2, 7 (1983).
33. Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/L.2, 5
(1984). The representative of Uruguay stated that his delegation continued to have its doubts,
basically from a juridical point of view, about the inclusion of universal jurisdiction in the
Draft Convention, but that it did not wish to stand in the way of consensus on the question.
The representative of Australia stated that his government was committed to the early
negotiation of a commitment for as strong a convention as possible. It was for this reason that
the Australian government had therefore joined the growing consensus in support of universal
jurisdiction. Id. at 7. The Chinese representative thought that the basic spirit of the Brazilian
proposal (see supra text accompanying note 30) was that the exercise of jurisdiction by a state
having jurisdiction under one of the enumerated criteria should have priority over the exercise
of jurisdiction based exclusively on the presence of an alleged offender in the territory of that
state party. Although this principle was not clearly stated in the form that the provisions eventually took, the Chinese found the universal jurisdiction provisions as adopted by the working
group to be acceptable. See generally id.
34. For the text of Article 5, see supra note 25. For the text of Article 7, see supra
note 27.
35. Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art. 7, para. 1.
36. Id. at art. 5, para. I(a).
37. Id. at art. 5, para. I(b).
38. Id. at art. 5, para. 1(c).
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The system of universal jurisdiction and the obligation of party
states to prosecute offenders or extradite them to another party state
for prosecution circumvent the problems previously encountered as a
result of the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of
states and the declaration of competence requirement.3 9 Under Articles 5 and 7 of the Draft Convention, states may comfortably apply
only those rules established under their own legal systems to the case
at hand. As a result of the use of the prosecuting state's system of
justice, international criminal justice standards of treatment do not
need to be harmonized with any domestic principles of criminal jurisprudence unique to that state. 4 The system of universal jurisdiction and the corresponding obligation to prosecute do nothing to
threaten the sovereignty of a party state. The cooperation of all
states in the protection of human rights is therefore encouraged. The
result is a realistic method of enforcement of internationally accepted human rights principles. 1
C. Methods of Enforcement - Actions to be Taken by the Committee Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
1. Establishment of the Committee Under the Draft Convention:
Article 17.-The success of an international agreement cannot depend alone on the method of enforcement adopted. A supranational
supervisory committee must also be appointed to coordinate the implementation and policing of the terms of the agreement.
With this in mind, the Swedish delegation proposed in 1978
that the Human Rights Committee established under Article 28 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights42 be appointed to supervise the implementation and policing of the Draft
39. See supra text accompanying notes 7-10.
40. Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention
or Imprisonment In Particular Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1984/SR.34, 17 (1984).
41. The system of universal jurisdiction has been adopted in many other international
treaties. See, e.g., The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
Dec. 16, 1970, Arts. 2, 4, 7 and 8, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192; The Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,
Arts. 3, 5, 7 and 8, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570; U.N. Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic
Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, Arts. 2, 3, 7 and 8, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532. The system
therefore deserves careful consideration.
Moreover, the system of universal jurisdiction and the obligation to prosecute eliminate
the need to enforce human rights norms through the retaliation by one state against another.
See supra note 10 for a discussion of D'Amato's theory regarding international enforcement of
state obligations. D'Amato himself admits that enforcement by retaliation could easily escalate
into full scale war. D'Amato, supra note 10, at 1122. The enforcement method prescribed in
Articles 5 and 7 of the Draft Convention would avoid this potential for war.
42. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966).
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Convention against Torture. The Legal Counsel of the United Nations advised against this, however, on the ground that the states
that would become parties to the Draft Convention would not necessarily be the same as the parties to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.' Several delegations agreed with the Legal Counsel. In addition, it was asserted that it would be difficult to
use a structure to implement one convention that had been established for the implementation of another. As these discussions proceeded, some speakers even broached the question of the advisability
of assigning extensive jurisdiction to any existing international body.
This latter group took the view that basic implementation procedures
could be assured by the individual signatory states within their own
legal systems. Yet another group considered it preferable to entrust
the task to a separate international body created specifically for the
implementation of the Draft Convention.
In view of these disagreements, Sweden submitted a revised
draft in 1981 which provided for the election by the state parties of a
committee composed of persons serving in an individual capacity
who "shall, so far as possible, be chosen among members of the
Human Rights Committee."" A number of delegates felt that this
revised Swedish text was a constructive proposal because it attempted to ensure the independence of the Committee from governmental instructions or pressures while at the same time avoiding the
difficulties previously pointed out by the United Nations Legal
Counsel.' 5
In 1982 the Chairman-Rapporteur also submitted a draft proposal. In an attempt to avoid establishing an entirely new committee
outside the structures already in existence for the protection of
human rights, he suggested that the machinery provided for in the
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid' might provide a constructive compromise. His
43. Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982/L.40, 12
(1982).
44. Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1982/L.40, Annex II, I (1981) at art. 17.
45. See supra text accompanying note 43.
46. G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 166, U.N. Doc. A/
9030 (1974). Under Article IX of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (Convention on Apartheid), the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights appoints a group consisting of three members of the Commission on
Human Rights who are also representatives of state parties to the Convention on Apartheid.
Id. at art. 9. That group then considers reports submitted by states in accordance with Article
VII of that same Convention. Id. at art. 7. The machinery provided for in Article VIII permits
any state party to the Convention on Apartheid to call upon any competent organ of the
United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as it considers
appropriate for the prevention and suppression of the crime of apartheid. Id. at art. 8.
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draft recommended that a separate Committee Against Torture be
established under the Convention. In addition he proposed that the
members of the Committee be elected by secret ballot and that in
nominating the candidates the state parties "bear in mind the usefulness of nominating persons who are also members of the Human
Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights . .. .,7
In 1983 the delegates resumed the discussion concerning the
form of an international supervisory committee based on a set of revised draft articles submitted by the government of Sweden and on
the proposal submitted by the Chairman-Rapporteur in 1982. Concentrating on the Chairman-Rapporteur's proposal, the working
47. U.N. Doc E/CN.4/1983/L.2, 9 (1983). As proposed by the Chairman-Rapporteur
in 1982, Article 17 read as follows:
I. There shall be established a Committee Against Torture (hereinafter
referred to as the Committee) which shall carry out the functions hereinafter
provided. The Committee shall consist of nine experts of high moral standing
and recognized competence in the field of human rights, who shall serve in their
personal capacity. The experts shall be elected by the states parties, consideration being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the usefulness of
the participation of some persons having legal experience.
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a
list of persons nominated by states parties. Each state party may nominate one
person from among its own nationals. State parties shall bear in mind the usefulness of nominating persons who are also members of the Human Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and are willing to serve on the Committee Against Torture.
3. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at biennial
meetings of states parties convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. At those meetings, for which two thirds of the states parties shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be those who obtain
the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of states parties present and voting.
4. The initial election shall be held no later than six months after the date
of the entry into force of this Convention. At least four months before the date
of each election the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a
letter to the states parties inviting them to submit their nominations within three
months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of all
persons thus nominated, indicating the states parties which have nominated
them, and shall submit it to the states parties.
5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four
years. They shall be eligible for re-election if renominated. However, the term of
four of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two
years; immediately after the first election the names of these four members shall
be chosen by lot by the chairman of the meeting referred to in paragraph 3.
6. For the filling of casual vacancies, the state party whose expert has
ceased to function as a member of the Committee shall appoint another expert
from among its nationals subject to the approval of the Committee.
7. The members of the Committee shall receive emoluments as well as
compensation for their expenses while they are in performance of Committee
functions, on such terms and conditions as the biennial meetings of states parties
may decide. The states parties shall be responsible for these emoluments and
expenses in the same proportions as their contributions to the general budget of
the United Nations.
Id. at 9-10.
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group commented on paragraphs (1), (2), (6) and (7).8 As a result
of these comments the Chairman-Rapporteur submitted minor revisions of some of these paragraphs.49 The main import of his draft
proposal, however, remained the same.
It was during the 1983 session that some of the delegates first
expressed the view that parties to the Draft Convention should have
the option to accept or not accept the authority of any supervisory
body created to implement the agreement as they chose. The delegation from the Soviet Union, for example, suggested that all the implementation provisions be included in an optional protocol. 50 The
Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic delegation, as a compromise
measure, proposed that the implementation provisions be retained in
the Draft Convention but that they be amended in such a way that
the only parties to be bound would be those that made formal statements recognizing the need for a supervising body or those that formally recognized the competence of that body. 51 As the 1983 session
closed, however, the majority of the delegations took the position
that the implementation provisions, including that establishing a supervisory body, should be mandatory upon all parties to the
Convention.5 2
When the working group of delegates returned in 1984, the representative from the Soviet Union announced that he would no
longer insist on making all elements of the implementation system
optional. 53 He even stated that his delegation would accept a provision making the authority of the supervisory committee mandatory
upon all party states."
48.
49.

Id. at 10-11.
The text for Article 17, paragraph 6 was revised to read:
If a member of the Committee dies or resigns or for any other cause can no
longer perform his Committee duties, the state party which nominated him shall
appoint another expert from among its nationals for the remainder of his term,
subject to the approval of the majority of the states parties. The approval shall
be considered given unless half or more of the states parties respond negatively
within six weeks after having been informed by the Secretary-General of the
United Nations of the proposed appointment.
Id. at I1. Cf. supra note 47.
The new text for Article 17, paragraph 7, was also revised:
The expenses of the members of the Committee while they are in performance of Committee duties shall be borne by the states parties in accordance with
the schemes of apportionment to be determined by the biennial meetings of
states parties.
Id. at 12. Cf. supra note 47.
50. Id. at 8.
51. Id. at 10.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1984/L.2, 9
(1984).
54. The optional/mandatory debate was also raised in relation to the provisions calling
for reporting by the party states to the supervisory committee. It was agreed in the 1984
session that reporting, too, would be mandatory. Id. at 9-10. See also infra text accompanying
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Additional minor revisions to the draft provision establishing the
Committee Against Torture were then made55 and as amended the
Chairman-Rapporteur's version was adopted by the delegates as Ar56
ticle 17 of the Draft Convention.
2. The Functions of the Committee.
(a) The Reports of States and the Authority of the Committee
to Make Comments and Suggestions on Such Reports: Article
19.-In addition to the establishment of the supervisory Committee
Against Torture, many delegates felt that to facilitate implementation and enforcement of the Draft Convention it was necessary to
notes 57-63.
55. The working group decided to replace the words "nine experts" in paragraph I by
"'ten experts." and to replace the word "four" in both parts of the second sentence of paragraph 5 by "five." Id. at 9.
56. As finally adopted, Article 17 of the Draft Convention reads as follows:
I. There shall be established a Committee against Torture (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) which shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided. The Committee shall consist of ten experts of high moral standing and
recognized competence in the field of human rights, who shall serve in the personal capacity. The experts shall be elected by the States Parties, consideration
being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the usefulness of the
participation of some persons having legal experience.
2. The members of the Committee shall be elected by secret ballot from a
list of persons nominated by States Parties. Each State Party may nominate one
person from among its own nationals. State Parties shall bear in mind the usefulness of nominating persons who are also members of the Human Rights Committee established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and are willing to serve on the Committee against Torture.
3. Elections of the members of the Committee shall be held at biennial
meetings of States Parties convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. At those meetings, for which two thirds of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum, the persons elected to the Committee shall be those who obtain
the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the representatives of States Parties present and voting.
4. The initial election shall be held no later than six months after the date
of the entry into force of this Convention. At least four months before the date
of each election the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall address a
letter to the States Parties inviting them to submit their nominations within
three months. The Secretary-General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of
all persons thus nominated, indicating the States Parties which have nominated
them, and shall submit it to the States Parties.
5. The members of the Committee shall be elected for a term of four
years. They shall be eligible for re-election if renominated. However, the term of
five of the members elected at the first election shall expire at the end of two
years; immediately after the first election the names of these five members shall
be chosen by lot by the chairman of the meeting referred to in paragraph 3.
6. If a member of the Committee dies or resigns or for any other cause
can no longer perform his Committee duties, the State Party which nominated
him shall appoint another expert from among its nationals for the remainder of
his term, subject to the approval of the majority of the States Parties. The approval shall be considered given unless half or more of the States Parties respond
negatively within six weeks after having been informed by the Secretary-General
of the United Nations of the proposed appointment.
7. States Parties shall be responsible for the expenses of the members of
the Committee while they are in performance of Committee duties.
Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art. 17.
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require that each party state submit periodic reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations detailing steps taken by that
state to further human rights. As originally submitted by the Chairman-Rapporteur Burgers of the Netherlands, Article 19 stated:
I. The states parties undertake to submit to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations reports on the measures they
have taken to give effect to their undertaking under this
Convention:
(a) Within one year of the entry into force of this
Convention for the state party concerned; and
(b) Wherever any new measures have been taken;
and
(c) When the Committee so requests.
2. Such reports shall be considered by the Committee,
which shall transmit them with such comments or suggestions as
it may consider appropriate to the states parties. The Committee
may also transmit such comments or suggests to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights along with copies of reports
it has received from the states parties.
3. The states parties may submit to the Committee observations on any comments or suggestions that may be made in accordance with paragraph 2.11
Among the comments made regarding this draft, the delegation
from Australia pointed out that the text did not make clear whether
the reports could lead to a dialogue between the Committee and the
state party itself and if so, whether the party could respond to the
Committee, thus giving that state an additional opportunity to express its own view. 5" Taking this and other suggestions, the Chairman-Rapporteur submitted yet another draft which changed
paragraphs 2 and 3 as follows:
2. The Secretary-General shall transmit the reports to all
state parties.
3. Each report shall be considered by the Committee which
may make such comments or suggestions on the report as it

may consider appropriate, and shall forward these to the state
party concerned, the state party may respond with any observations it chooses to the Committee.
4. The Committee may, at its discretion, decide to include
any comments or suggestions made by it in accordance with paragraph 3, together with the observations thereon received from
57. Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1983/L.2, 13-14
(1983).
58. Id. at 15.
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This latest revision appeared to be accepted by all delegations in
1983. At the 1984 session, however, the Soviet representatives advised the group that the "comments or suggestions" provisions in
paragraph 3 and the content of paragraph 4 were unsatisfactory.
The Soviets felt that these paragraphs would give the Committee the
power to interfere in the internal affairs of parties states.60 In lieu of
the "comments or suggests" language, the Soviets proposed that the
phrase "general comments and suggestions" be used.6 1 This proposal
was in the same vein as a recommendation made by the Ukranian
representative in 1983 to amend paragraph 1 of the draft Article 19
to read as follows: "The states parties which announced their recognition of the Committee's status undertake to submit to the Secretary-General . . . reports . .

.,,"

After much debate regarding the proposed replacement of the
"comments or suggestions" language, the working group reached the
consensus that their differences were political and could not be resolved. They therefore left the formulation of Article 19 to the General Assembly. The test of Article 19 as formulated by the General
Assembly and incorporated into the Draft Convention Against Torture now reads:
1. The States Parties shall submit to the Committee,
through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, reports on
the measure they have taken to give effect to their undertakings
under this Convention, within one year after the entry into force
of the Convention for the State Party concerned. Thereafter, the
States Parties shall submit supplementary reports every four
years on any new measures taken, and such other reports as the
Committee may request.
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the reports to all States Parties.
3. Each Report shall be considered by the Committee which
may make such general comments or suggestions on the report
as it may consider appropriate and shall forward these to the
59. Id. (emphasis supplied).
60. Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to any Form of Detention
or Imprisonment in Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1984/SR.33, 3 (1984).
61. Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1984/L.2, 9
(1984). The "general comments and suggestions" language would have brought this portion of
the Draft Convention in conformity with the language in Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
62. Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Do. E/CN.4/1983/L.2, 14
(1983)
(italicized portion indicates the recommendation made by the Ukranian
representative).
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State Party concerned. That State Party may respond with any
observations it chooses to the Committee.
4. The Committee may, at its discretion, decide to include
any comments made by it in accordance with paragraph 3 of
this article, together with the observations thereon received from
the State Party concerned, in its annual report made in accordance with Article 24. If so requested by the State Party concerned, the Committee may also include a copy of the report
submitted under paragraph I of this article. 3
As originally drafted, the broad power to make "comments or
suggestions" would have enabled the Committee to make specific as
well as general comments at its discretion." The more restrictive
"general comments" language adopted into the final version of Article 19 limits the Committee to making general comments only. 6 5 The
text of the Draft Convention therefore falls short of providing the
Committee with adequate authority to fulfill all its assigned functions. It is, however, a political compromise made possible by the
existence of similar language in other international agreements to
which the states drafting the Draft Convention Against Torture were
parties.6"
(b) The Power of the Committee to Initiate Enquiries into Allegations of Torture: Article 20.-Another section of the Draft Convention sharply criticized for authorizing Committee interference in
the internal affairs of the state parties is Article 20.7 As originally
submitted by the Chairman-Rapporteur, Mr. Burgers of the Netherlands in 1983, Article 20 reads as follows:
1. If the Committee receives information from any source
which in its view appears to indicate that torture is being systematically practiced in the territory of a state party, the Committee shall invite that state party to submit observations with
regard to the information concerned.
63. Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art. 19.
64. See supra text accompanying note 59.
65. Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art. 19, para. 3.
66. See, e.g., Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 40, para. 4, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 9, para. 2, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (adopted
Dec. 21, 1965, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) (except that this latter Convention speaks of
"general recommendations" rather than "general comments").
67. Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art. 20. The Soviet delegation
expressed dissatisfaction with this article at the same time it objected to Article 19. See supra
text accompanying notes 60-61. The Bulgarian delegation agreed with the Soviets, saying that
the far-reaching powers of the Committee Against Torture provided for in the draft of Article
20 could easily lead to an unacceptable interference in the internal affairs of states. Question
of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to any Form of Detention or Imprisonment in
Particular: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1984/SR.33, 3 (1984).
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2. On the basis of all relevant information available to the
Committee, including any observations which may have been
submitted by the state concerned, the Committee may if it decides that this is warranted, designate one or more of its members to make a confidential enquiry and to report to the Committee urgently.
3. An enquiry made in accordance with paragraph 2 may
include a visit to the territory of the state party concerned, unless the Government of that state party when informed of the
intended visit, does not give its consent.
4. After examining the report of its member or members
submitted in accordance with paragraph 2, the Committee may
transmit to the state party concerned any comments or suggestions which seem appropriate in view of the situation.
5. All the proceedings of the Committee under this article
shall be confidential.68
Upon discussion among the delegations of the working group,
paragraphs 1, 3, and 5 were revised in an attempt to require the
Committee to first ascertain the reliability of the information, to ensure that the cooperation of the state party concerned was sought
prior to the initiation of an enquiry, and to increase the importance
of keeping the proceedings confidential. As amended and eventually
adopted by the working group, the paragraphs appear as follows:
1. If the Committee receives information which appears to
contain reliable indications that torture is being systematically
practiced in the territory of a state party, the Committee shall
invite that state party to submit observations with regard to the
information concerned.
3. If an enquiry is made in accordance with paragraph 2,
the Committee shall seek the cooperation of the state party concerned. In agreement with that state party, such an enquiry may
include a visit to its territory.
5. All the proceedings of the Committee referred to in the
paragraphs 1-4 shall be confidential. After such proceedings
have been completed with regard to an enquiry made in accordance with paragraph 2, the Committee may at its discretion,
decide to include a summary account of the results of the proceedings in its annual report .... 69
Notwithstanding the strides the Draft Convention Against Tor70
ture made in the creation of a workable enforcement mechanism,
state demands for absolute sovereignty and non-interference in do68.
69.
70.
system).

U.N. Doc.E/CN.4/1983/L.2, 15-16 (1983).
Id. at 16-17.
See supra text accompanying notes 25-41 (regarding the universal jurisdiction

Spring 19861

DRAFT CONVENTION

mestic affairs were not complete ignored or avoided. Article 20 is a
prime example of how compromises resulting from these demands
limited the extent of the enforcement provisions finally adopted.
One such compromise can be found in the confidentiality provision set forth in paragraph 5 of Article 20. Embarrassing public disclosure of human rights violations would undoubtedly be one of the
most effective means of preventing state parties from perpetrating
such crimes. Confidentiality and secrecy severely limit the very deterrence effect that the Convention is intended to have.
Another aspect of Article 20 that emanated from a desire to
satisfy the self-serving interests of all the states is the fact that the
Article provides exclusively for Committee initiation and supervision
of enquiries. Nothing in this Article or any other article of the Convention provides for enquiries by nongovernmental organizations.
The International Commission of Jurists 71 and Amnesty International,72 for example, are both organizations that have been deeply
involved in investigating, representing, and assisting the victims of
human rights violations. 73 Such organizations could play a highly
constructive role in the implementation of this Convention if the delegates had provided for their participation. The delegates, however,
were more concerned with preventing third party intervention in
their states' internal affairs than creating the most effective enforcement mechanism possible.
The failure of the drafters to include private organizations in
their program for enforcement and their provision for the confidentiality of Committee enquiries are not the only ways in which the potential effectiveness of the Draft Convention was impaired. The
drafters included other provisions specifically limiting the authority
of the Committee Against Torture.
(c) Limitations on the Power of the Committee.-Under Articles 21 and 22 of the Draft Convention, the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from a state party
regarding human rights violations allegedly committed by another
state is subject to a condition precedent. According to that condition
precedent, the accusing state must itself have recognized the compe71. The International Commission of Jurists is a human rights organization comprised
of judges and lawyers from 50 countries. See International Commission of Jurists, Objectives,
Organization, Activities (1972); 15 Y.B. INT'L ORGANIZATIONS 284-85 (1974).
72. Amnesty International is a nongovernmental human rights organization that has
more than 500,000 private citizen members in over 150 countries and territories. It is primarily concerned with the release of "prisoners of conscience" - men and women detained anywhere for their beliefs, colour, sex, ethnic origin, language or religion, provided they have not
used or advocated violence. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL. TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES 264 (1984).
73. For a discussion of the role of non-governmental organizations in the implementation of human rights, see Weissbrodt, The Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Implementation of Human Rights, 12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 293 (1977).
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tence of the Committee to receive and consider allegations regarding
its own human rights track record. 74 In addition, paragraph 1 of Article 21 provides that: "No communications shall be dealt with by
the Committee under this Article if it concerns a State Party which
has not made . . . a declaration [recognizing the competence of the
Committee] "Th Thus, under Article 21, if a victim of a human rights
violation wishes to seek the intervention of a state, he or she must
select a state party who has accepted the competence of the Committee Against Torture. And if that state consents to take the individual's case, the Committee can only consider the evidence submitted if the accused state party has also declared that it will accept the
competence of the Committee.
Likewise, if an individual victim of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment wishes to accuse a party
state, his or her communication to the Committee will not be accepted unless the accused state has agreed to allow the Committee to
accept communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its
jurisdiction. This requirement is set forth in Article 22, at paragraph
1:
A State Party to this Convention may at any time declare
under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by a State Party of the provisions of the
Convention. No communications shall be received by the Committee if it concerns
a State Party which has not made such a
6
declaration.7
The effect of Articles 21 and 22 is to make the provisions of the
Convention optional to all parties. Article 28 further emphasizes this
option: "Each State may, at the time of signature or ratification of
this Convention or accession thereto, declare that it does not recognize the competence of the Committee . . . .77 This failure to require mandatory acceptance of the competence of the Committee
Against Torture neutralizes the power of enforcement that the innovative system of universal jurisdiction 78 and other provisions 79 of the
74. Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art. 21, para. 1,art. 22, para.
1.This is a version of the declaration of competence requirement mentioned supra at text
accompanying note 9.
75. Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art. 21, para. I. See also Report of the Working Group on a Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/1984/72 (1984).
76. Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art. 22, para. 1.
77. Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art. 28.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 25-41.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 42-56 (regarding the reporting requirement of
the states). See also supra notes 57-66 (regarding the power of the Committee to initiate

Spring 19861

DRAFT CONVENTION

Convention would have had otherwise."0 As a result, states that practice torture under the authority of official policy and violate the accepted norms of conduct regarding human rights can ratify the Convention and look very good from a public relations point of view.
Simultaneously, however, they can preclude the Committee from
taking any action against them by simply not accepting its authority
under Articles 21 and 22.
Ill.

Enforcement Mechanisms -

Will any Theory Really Work?

As stated earlier, world-wide mechanisms for tackling violations
of human rights are currently inadequate.8 ' Debate rages over
whether there will ever be any international legal system that will
have the power to enforce the basic principles of human rights. The
two main theoreticians in this area are Professors J.S. Watson and
Anthony D'Amato.
Professor D'Amato stands for the proposition that although the
international legal system is not a hierarchial order, organizations of
states may horizontally impose sanctions upon state violators of
human rights by ostracizing those states from the world community.82 Each state, under international law, is guaranteed certain
rights or entitlements. In ostracizing a state the world community
would simply ignore the state's entitlements.8 3
Professor Watson argues that the violators of international
human rights norms are quite possibly in the majority. The problem
cannot therefore be disposed of by calling for cooperation among the
states in designating the violator an international deviant, as proposed by Professor D'Amato.
Looking to the source of the enforcement problem, Professor
Watson argues that the inability to force compliance with human
rights standards can only be explained by the fact that 1) human
rights are not currently subject to the jurisdiction of international
law, or 2) the structures of the present international legal system are
enquiries into allegations of violations).
80. The Draft Convention would be more effective if, for example, the drafters had
adopted a mandatory system of implementation similar to that provided for in Article I of the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966:
A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a party to the present Protocol
recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a
violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, art. I,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
81. See supra note lo (statement of Theo Van Boven).
82. D'Amato, supra note 10, at 1120.
83. Id. See also supra note 10.
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so ineffective as to be completely worthless."4 The proponents of
human rights, he states, have failed to perceive the discrepancy between international law as they pronounce it and social-political reality. It is only in the actual practice of states that the rules governing
the international legal system can be found, and the actual rules do
not comport with those that the human rights proponents assert exist. 85 In addition, Professor Watson complains that human rights
proponents have failed to question the validity and effectiveness of
the international legal system.8 Under Watson's theory, mere establishment of norms for the protection of human rights are inefficacious and invalid because of the lack of state to state reciprocity.,7
The creation of a supranational legal system, he asserts, is a metalegal question. 8
In short, the world has been attempting to apply a sanctionoriented philosophy in a system based on consent and reciprocity.
This is a fact that has been dealt with in only a few studies on
human rights - too few, in Professor Watson's opinion. The world
must recognize and acknowledge the lack of political power behind
international law. As Professor Watson put it, "If international law
is to succeed in having any normative function at all, it is essential
that it first perform an accurate descriptive function." 89 For it is only
by realizing exactly how the current international legal system operates, that changes can be implemented to create efficacious and valid
international agreements.
The Draft Convention Against Torture takes several new steps
in this direction. The implementation of a universal system of jurisdiction is but one example.90 Further action could be taken, however,
by groups interested in promoting human rights. The following proposals incorporate Professor Watson's criteria and standard and, if
adopted, would promote the validity and efficacy of human rights/
norms.
IV. After the Draft Convention tection of Human Rights

Recommendations for the Pro-

As stated in the introduction to this article, two major obstacles
have inhibited the operation of past international human rights
agreements: the principle of non-interference and the requirement
that states formally recognize the competence of whichever supervis84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Legal Theory, supra note 10, at 612.
Id. at 610.
Id.
Id. at 626.
Id. at 621.
Id. at 635.
See supra text accompanying notes 25-41.
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ing international body was established under that agreement. 91 The
adoption of a system of universal jurisdiction under Articles 5 and 7
of the Draft Convention Against Torture did much to address the
fear at the heart of the non-interference principle - that international standards of conduct would be imposed upon a party state
against its will and contrary to its best interests.9 2 That fear was not
alleviated enough, however, for the delegates to exclude a declaration of competence requirement from the final draft of the Convention. 93 The consequence of this requirement is that notwithstanding
the acceptance of the universal system of jurisdiction, the Draft Convention Against Torture faces the same handicaps as previous international human rights agreements. 9 ' Without mandatory requirements, the provisions of the Draft Convention will be, strictly
speaking, unenforceable.
This does not mean, however, that the Draft Convention has no
hope of being effective. Its most positive contribution to the promotion of human rights ideals is its establishment of internationally accepted standards of conduct. Using those standards, international organizations could promote human rights world-wide using two vastly
different methods: they could persuade individual states to incorporate those human rights standards into their domestic legal systems,
and they could encourage groups of states to use non-military force
to coerce other states into honoring basic human rights principles.
A.

The Incorporation of Human Rights Standards into the Na-

tional Legislations of States
Article 10 of the Draft Convention states:
Each State Party shall ensure that education and information regarding the prohibition against torture are fully included
in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or military,
medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be
91. See supra text accompanying note 10.
92. See discussion supra at text accompanying notes 25-41.
93. Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at arts. 20, 21 and 22. See also
discussion supra at text accompanying notes 77-80.
94. See, e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, at
art. 25, para. I (1955) (stating that complaints will be entertained only against states that
have recognized the competence of the commission established under this convention); American Convention on Human Rights, signed Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978,
O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, at I O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. L./V/lI. 23 doc. 2/rev. 6 at art. 45,
para. 2 ("Communications presented by virtue of this article may be admitted and examined
only if they are presented by a State Party that has made a declaration recognizing the aforementioned competence of the Commission. The Commission shall not admit any communication against a State Party that has not made such a declaration."); Resolution of the Economic
and Social Council of the U.N. of May of 1970, adopted May 27, 1970, 48 U.N. ESCOR,
Supp. (No. IA) 8 U.N. Doc. E/4832/Add. I (1970) (requiring the express consent of the
state implicated in a gross violation of human rights).
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involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or

imprisonment. 95

The Draft Convention under this Article encourages the incorporation into all levels of a state's government the basic human rights
principles set forth by the Convention.
In the United States this gradual incorporation of international
human rights standards into the domestic legal system has occurred
through the passage of statutes9" and the flow of common law jurisprudence.97 The Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA), for example, was
amended in 1976 to provide federal jurisdiction over torts occurring
in violation of the law of nations. 98
As for case law, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 1900
in the Paquete Habana" case that "[i]nternational law is part of our
law, and must be ascertained and administered by courts of justice
of appropriate jurisdiction .... "100 The Second Circuit deviated

slightly from this principle in 1975 and 1976 in the cases of ITT v.
Vencap, Ltd.10 1 and Dreyfus v. Von Finck.'° In ITT, plaintiff, a
Luxembourg investment trust, sued a Bahamian corporation for
fraud, conversion, and corporate waste. The Second Circuit held that
the ACTA did not confer jurisdiction over wrongs that are merely of
concern to the parties involved. The ACTA instead confers jurisdiction over wrongs that are of international concern and violative of
international law.103 In Dreyfus the court refused to apply international law when the violation at issue occurred between nationals of
95. Draft Convention Against Torture, supra note 9, at art. 10, para. 1.
96. Wilner, Filartigav. Pena-Irala: Comments on Sources of Human Rights Law and
Means of Redress for Violations of Human Rights, II GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 317, 318
(1981); Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
than States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. I, 9-17 (1982); Note, The Application of InternationalHuman
Rights in United States Courts: Customary InternationalLaw Incorporated into American
Domestic Law, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 207, 208-209 (1982).
97. R. Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting International Human
Rights Norms, 24 N.Y. LAW SCHOOL L. REV. 153, 177 (1978).
98. Judicial Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 9, 1Stat. 73, 77 (1789). The Act, as amended, can
be found in 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976). The pertinent portion of the Act states:
And be it further enacted, that the district courts . . . shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, or the circuit courts as
the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of
the law of nations or treaty of the United States.
Id.
99. 175 U.S. 677 (1900). At the out-break of the Spanish-American war, the United
States captured two fishing vessels owned by Spanish subjects. The crews of each vessel had
been fishing off the coast of Cuba and claimed they had no knowledge of the war or the
American blockage. In Paquete Habana the United States Supreme Court applied the established common law rule and held that fishing vessels and their cargoes are exempt from capture as prizes of war.
100. Id. at 700.
101. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
102. 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
103. 519 F.2d at 1015.
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the same sovereign.? ° The Second Circuit implicitly overruled these
decisions in 1980, however, when it decided the Filartiga v. PenaIrala0 5 case. The main issue in Filartigawas whether torture was a
violation of the law of nations, therefore giving the federal courts
jurisdiction of the action under the Alien Tort Claims Act. 0 6 The
District Court had followed ITT and Dreyfus in holding that the
Alien Tort Claims Act should be construed narrowly to exclude from
its ambit cases dealing with a state's treatment of its own nationals.107 The Second Circuit overruled, noting that "torture committed
by a state official against one held in detention violates established
norms of the international law of human rights, and hence the law of
0 8o
nations.'
The United States Alien Tort Claims Act and the Filartigacase
both illustrate how, when international human rights standards are
adopted into a domestic system of jurisprudence, human rights
norms can be implemented and enforced.10 International organizations interested in enhancing human rights would be more effective if
they placed less faith on the power of supranational organizations
and agreements and concentrated their efforts on promoting the legislative adoption of human rights norms into the domestic laws of
individual states.
B. Interstate Coercion Through Non-Military Force
The U.N. Charter prohibits the threat of the use of force only
when such methods violate the Charter or the purposes espoused by
the Charter." 0 The promotion of human rights, however, is one of
104. 534 F.2d at 30-31. In Dreyfus, the plaintiff, a Swiss citizen and resident, sued to
recover from West German citizens and residents for allegedly wrongful confiscation of property in Nazi Germany. The court ruled that violations of international law do not occur when
the aggrieved party is a national of the acting state and held that the plaintiff failed to state a
cognizable claim since at the time of the alleged wrongdoing he was a citizen of Germany. See
generally id.
105. 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980). See J.P. George, Defining Filartiga: Characterizing International Torture claims in United States Courts, 3 DICK. J. INT'L L. I (1984).
106. 630 F.2d at 880. For the text of the Alien Tort Claims Act see supra note 98.
107. 630 F.2d at 880.
108. Id.
109. The legal system in the United States also illustrates how imperative it is to the
enforcement of human rights that international norms find their way into domestic legislation
rather than relying on international treaties and agreements. Article VI of the United States
Constitution declares that treaties made under the authority of the United States are "the
supreme Law of the Land." Most international agreements to which the United States is a
party, however, are unratified by the United States Senate as required by the Constitution of
all treaties. These agreements are therefore not treaties or the supreme law of the land unless
they are self-executing. No human rights agreement to which the United States is a party is
self-executing, nor has the Senate ratified any of these agreements. Therefore, the terms of
these agreements, rather than being mandatory, are merely instructive upon courts in the
United States. Comment, After Tel-Oren: Should Federal Courts Infer a Cause of Action
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 3 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 281, 289 (1985).
110. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4. See also JULIUS STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD
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the major purposes underlying the Charter of the United Nations.11
The U.N. Charter therefore authorizes the Security Council to recommend economic sanctions to give effect to its decisions.1 2 The
countries of the United Nations, by signing the Charter, dedicated
themselves to the establishment of conditions under which justice
and the respect for human rights can be promoted and enforced
under numerous international treaties and other agreements. The international community is therefore under a moral and legal obligation to use economic coercion against violators of human rights.
The use of non-military economic force for the purpose of enforcing human rights is not a breach of international law but a fulfillment of the obligations arising under the United Nations Charter
and other international treaties. The world community, through the
United Nations Security Council, has the right to assert and maintain international obligations and world order. Indeed, if the world
community neglected this duty, gross violations of human rights
could trigger revolution and military retaliations.1 3 World peace
would thus be endangered. The Security Council therefore would be
well within its powers if it characterized any gross violation of
human rights as a "breach" and a "threat" to world peace and a
contravention of international law. Upon such characterization, the
Council would have the authority to invoke Article 41114 of the
Charter against the violators and demand that other signatory states
implement whatever measures the Council decided were necessary.
The world community has the power, through economic sanction, to promote and enforce human rights. International organizations dedicated to the advancement of human rights should encourage all states to work together to force implementation of the
basic human rights standards contained in such documents as the
Draft Convention Against Torture.
V.

Conclusion
The founders of the United Nations had a vision. In that vision

ORDER 95 (1958); F.I. Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591-627 (1974); R.J. Alfaro, "La Question de la Definition de
I'Agression,'"29 Revue de Droit Internationale 367, 374 (1951). See also Higgings, The Legal
Limits to the Use of Force by Sovereign States: United Nations Practice, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 269, 276 (1961); D. Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L.
245, 251 n.21 (1976); W. M. REISMAN. NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS, 839 (1971).
111. U.N. CHARTER, art. I, para. 3.
112. U.N. CHARTER, art. 41.
113. This is precisely what happened in Iran in 1979 and what is currently happening in
South Africa.
114. U.N. CHARTER, art. 41. Article 41 provides: "The Security Council may decide
what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its
decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures."
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they saw the world community proceed through the post-war period
in a step by step progression toward a closely knit society dedicated
to the goals of peace, human rights, and social development. During
much of the history of the United Nations, however, progress toward
these goals has been crippled by politically inspired barriers involving domestic jurisdiction, the associated principle of non-interference, and declaration of competence requirements.
The Draft Convention Against Torture is an attempt to circumvent these political barriers. In the area of jealously guarded domestic jurisdiction, the system of universal jurisdiction substantially resolves state concerns regarding the potential loss of control over
domestic legal systems. The delegates to the Convention were unable, however, to eliminate the declaration of competence requirements. These requirements effectively paralyze the enforcement
mechanisms incorporated into the Draft Convention, even those pertaining to the universal system of jurisdiction.
The world is not without hope, however. Perhaps someday state
governments will have enough faith in enforcement mechanisms such
as the universal jurisdiction system to forego the declaration of competence requirements. In addition, there are the proposals set forth
in this article for increasing the efficacy and validity of established
human rights norms.
If international organizations campaign properly, the international human rights standards embodied in documents such as the
Draft Convention will become part of the domestic laws of the world
community and therefore be enforced within each state. The world
community also has within its power the ability to coerce, via economic sanctions, any state found in violation of human rights norms
to comply with those norms. These proposals are a careful reply to
both Professors D'Amato and Watson because they produce and operate within the functions of a supranational legal system1 15 without
requiring the establishment of an international governing social
structure. 11 6
Through the combined use of these methods of persuasion and
enforcement, the inherent dignity and worth of each human being
may be promoted throughout the world and each citizen will reap
the benefits of greater social progress and a better standard of life.

115. N.G. Onuf and V. Spike Peterson, "Human Rights From an International Regimes Perspective," J. INT'L AFFAIRS, 329-342 (1983).
116. J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE, 114 n.124 (1966).

